Can Computers Think? The History and Status of the Debate - Map 1 of 7

問題6

Issue Area: Is the brain a computer?

問題域： 人腦是計算機嗎？

The link to the part of the map this discussion is about: http://www.macrovu.com/CCTWeb/CCT1/CCTMap1Brain.html

1. Alan Turing, 1950, Yes, machines can (or will be able to) think. A computational system can possess all important elements of human thinking or understanding.
I believe that at the end of the century ... one will be able to speak of machines thinking without expecting to be contradicted.

公共起點

78. (Supporting 1) The biological assumption. The brain is a machine that can think. Its neurobiological processes are similar to or identical with the information processes of a computer.

Note: More specific versions of the biological assumption argument are represented on Map 3 and on Map 5.

（支持1） 生物學假設。人腦是一個能思考的機器。其神經(jīng)生物學過程和計算機的信息處理過程相似或相同。

注： 更具體的生物學假設論點見第三和第五圖。

79. (Disputing 78) John Searle, 1992 Nothing is intrinsically a digital computer.The syntatic structures that define computers are not intrinsic to physics; they are ascribed to physical systems by humans. So the question, "Is the brain a digital comptuer?" is ill-defined, because syntax can be ascribed to any sufficiently complex system. Syntactic structures are not just multiply realizable in numerous physical systems, they are universally realizable in any physical system.(It is too arbitrary of this argument to think a digital computing system has to be implemented at a relatively higher physical level; and it's equally arbitrary to believe that implementation at such a level can yield valuable consequences; as it seems to me it's because it might have ignored the significance of the computation/thinking (as they are not yet proven equivalent) being implemented with the micro physical structure like in the form of either biochemical nerual processes for a human brain or electronical and quantum mechanical processes for a modern digital computer and such implementations as these are as so far discovered supported by rather than innumerable and unversal instances as described by the author a very limited set of physical constructs, specifically biological neural system and silicon-based elecronic system. The fact that physical characteristics of electronics and related materials can be utilized to efficientlyrealize digital computer is largely from a philosophical view by chance or God's design, rather than merely something that's been ascribed to physics by humans. However the problem is that while whether a brain is a digital computer or not remains a question, it's not safe to say brain is not a digital computer;? that's the main problem this argument has. However the point where it gets challenged by the following arguments is its claim that programs are universally realizable, which is fairly independent of the original statement -- translator)

"The wall can be interpreted as a digital computer."

（反對78） John Searle，1992 沒有什么東西從本質上說是一個計算機。 用于定義計算機（行為）的語法結構并非是物理世界所固有的。他們是由人賦予物理系統(tǒng)的屬性。所以“人腦是否是計算機”這個問題的定義有問題，因為語法屬性可以被賦予任何足夠復雜的系統(tǒng)，語法結構并非只是在某些物理系統(tǒng)中可以實現(xiàn)，他們能在任何物理系統(tǒng)中實現(xiàn)。

“墻壁能被看作是一個數(shù)字計算機。”

80. (Disputing 79) Jack Copeland, 1993 Programs are not universally realizable.Even if it is true that during some interval of time a pattern of molecule movements on the wall is isomorphic with, for example, the formal pattern of the WordStar computer program, the wall will not support the same counterfactuals as the program. If the WordStar program had been given different input, it would have behaved differently. But the wall, which was not engineered to implement WordStar, would not respond to different "input" (that is, a different pattern of molecular organsiation) in the same way. So WordStar is not universally realizable. (If the molecular organsiation and movement is in some way tuned to be the same as the computer program with isomorphic input and output interfaces deployed, I can't see why the wall can't behave the same way as the program；again essentially it's a problem of who does that and/or by what means -- translator)

coun-ter-fac-tu-al: A conditional (if-then) statement whose "if" clause runs counter to the facts of reality. For example, the statement, "if pigs had wings then they would fly." is a counterfactual, because the "if" clause--that pigs have wings--is false.

"The wall doesn't support the same counterfactuals as WordStar"

（反駁79） Jack Copeland, 1993 程序并可以被普遍實現(xiàn)。即使在某個時間段，墻上分子運動的圖案可以與，比如WordStar（一種早期的計算機字處理程序——編者）的運行模式同構，但墻壁不能支持WordStar的非現(xiàn)實假設。如果WordStar被給予不同的輸入，它將以不同方式行動。然而墻壁，由于并沒有被工程化設計成WordStar，它不能像程序那樣對不同輸入“作出”響應（即，一個不同的分組組織圖案）。因此WordStar不是可以被普遍實現(xiàn)的。

非現(xiàn)實假設：指一個（如果-就，if-then）條件語句中如果從句的陳述與現(xiàn)實不符的假設情形。例如，陳述，“如果豬有翅膀就能在天上飛。”是一個非現(xiàn)實假設，因為豬有翅膀是假的。

“墻壁不支持WordStar的非現(xiàn)實假設特性”

81. (Disputing 80) John Searle, 1992 Universal realizability is not essential to the argument.Even without universal realizablity, it is still true that syntax is observer relative. And this is enough to show that nothing, including the brain, is intrinsically a digital computer.

（反駁80） John Searle，1992 普遍實現(xiàn)對這個觀點而言（任何事物本質上都不是計算機）不是必須的。即使沒有普遍實現(xiàn)性。仍舊可以說語法是相對于觀察者的。這已經(jīng)足夠說明任何事物包括人腦本質上都不是數(shù)字計算機。

82. (Supporting 79) Formal programs can be realized in multiple physical media.The same formal program could be realized in a digital computer, in a human brain, in beer cans and toilet paper, or in any number of physical implementations. The program is defined solely in terms of its formal syntatic structure; its mode of physical implementation is irrelevant. (My comments on 79 may more suitably apply to this argument -- translator)
Note: For more multiple realizability arguments, see the "Can functional states generate consciousness?" arguments on Map 6 and sidebar, "Formal Systems: An Overview," on Map 7.

（支持79） 正規(guī)程序可以在多種物理介質中實現(xiàn)。同一個正規(guī)程序可以在數(shù)字計算機，人腦，啤酒罐或衛(wèi)生紙上實現(xiàn)，以任何數(shù)量的物理實現(xiàn)出現(xiàn)。程序只是以其正規(guī)的語法結構定義。這與其物理實現(xiàn)的模式是無關的。

83. (Supporting 78) The operation of the brain is computable. Once we have a sufficient understanding of the laws of physics and the structure of the brain, we will be able to precisely simulate the operation of the brain with a computer.

（支持78） 大腦的工作是可以計算的。 一旦我們掌握了足夠的關于大腦物理屬性和結構的規(guī)律的知識，我們就能用計算機精確地模擬大腦的運行。

84. (Disputing 83) Roger Penrose, 1990 Low-level quantum effects are uncomputable. The biological phenomena that underlie consciousness operate at a level at which quantum effects could exert an influence. Because quantum effects are not computable, the brain and consciousness may be noncomputatational and nonalgorithmic. (I feel I can never challenge Dr Penrose, and I feel very pleased not to be able to challenge him -- translator)

（反駁83） 羅杰·彭羅斯，1990 低級（微觀層面）量子效應是不可計算的。意識所賴以存在的生物現(xiàn)象是在一個量子物理效應能夠起作用的層面上展開的。因為量子效應是不可計算的，人腦和意識應該也是無法計算并且非算法的。

85. (Disputing 84) Keith Stanovich, 1990 And then a miracle happens... Penrose does not explain how quantum effects in the brain might affect consciousness. He simply assumes that quantum effects and the brain are miraculously related. (This is by no means persuasive -- translator)

"That's an explanation by miracle!"

（反駁84） Keith Stanovich，1990 于是一個奇跡發(fā)生了…… 彭羅斯沒有解釋量子效應如何影響意識。他只是假設了量子效應和腦活動奇跡般地聯(lián)系起來。

86. (Disputing 84) Herbert Simon, 1995 Quantum effects are irrelevant to symbolic processes.Quantum uncertainties are unimportant to the study of symbolic thought processes, because they occur at a low level of organization and are averaged out before they can affect higher-level processes. (This one is more competent; however you also need to provide evidence that all conscious processes are symbolic and only the higher-level processes that matter -- translator)

（反駁84） Herbert Simon，1995 量子效應和符號過程是無關的。量子不確定性對符號思考并不重要，因為他們發(fā)生在整個組織的最低層面上，它們在影響高層過程之前就被平均化掉了。

轉載于:https://www.cnblogs.com/quanben/archive/2011/10/28/3128891.html

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